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Abstract 
 
Background:
 
 During the fall of 2014, the threat of an Ebola outbreak gripped the United States 
(Poll, October 8-12, 2014), creating a unique opportunity to advance basic knowledge 
concerning how emotion regulation works in consequential contexts and translate existing 
research in this area to inform public health and policy.  
Method: We addressed these issues by examining whether 3rd person self-talk, a simple 
technique that promotes emotion regulation, could nudge people into reasoning about Ebola 
more rationally. 1257 people from across the United States were asked to write about their 
feelings about Ebola using their name or I (i.e., 3rd person self-talk vs. 1st
 
 person self-talk) as 
concerns about Ebola swelled (10/24/14-10/26/14).  
Results:
 
 Third-person self-talk led participants who scored high on Ebola worry at baseline to 
generate more fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola, which predicted reductions in their 
Ebola worry and risk perception. These findings held when controlling for several theoretically 
relevant covariates, highlighting their robustness.  
Conclusion:
 
 These results demonstrate how a simple linguistic technique can enhance rational 
thinking and quell worry about a pressing public health threat. 
Keywords: Emotion regulation, psychological distance, self-regulation, self-control, worry, 
anxiety 
 
On September 30, 2014, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
confirmed the first-ever case of Ebola in the United States. Shortly following this announcement, 
anxiety concerning the threat of an Ebola outbreak developed despite repeated assurances from 
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public health and policy officials that the actual risk of such an outbreak was low. According to 
one nationally representative poll conducted between 10/18/14 and 10/24/14, approximately 52% 
of adults living in the United States were concerned about the prospect of a large-scale Ebola 
outbreak (Poll, October 8-12, 2014).  
This crisis created a unique opportunity to advance basic knowledge concerning how 
emotion regulation works in consequential contexts and translate existing research in this area to 
inform public health and policy. We capitalized on this opportunity by examining whether 3rd
Self-talk as an emotion regulation mechanism 
 
person self-talk, a simple linguistic technique that promotes emotion regulation (e.g., Dolcos & 
Albarracin, 2014; Kross et al., 2014; Moser et al., 2017; Nook, Schleider, & Somerville, 2017; 
Streamer, Seery, Kondrack, Lamarche, & Saltsman, 2017; Zell, Warriner, & Albarracin, 2012), 
could “nudge” people living in the United States into reasoning about Ebola more rationally as 
concerns about this issue swelled.  
“Self-talk” is ubiquitous; we all have an internal monologue that guides our moment-to-
moment reflections (Diaz & Berk, 1992; Kohlberg, Yaeger, & Hjertholm, 1968; Vygotsky, 
1962). Recent work demonstrates that small shifts in the language people use to refer to the self 
as they engage in this process consequentially influences emotion regulation. Specifically, 
laboratory research indicates that using one’s own name and other non-1st person pronouns to 
refer to the self during introspection (i.e., “Why is Maya feeling this way?”), rather than the 1st
How does 3
 
person pronoun “I” (i.e., “Why am I feeling this way?”), enhances people’s ability to control 
their thoughts, feelings, and behavior under stress (e.g., Kross et al., 2014; Moser et al., 2017; 
Nook et al., 2017; Streamer et al., 2017) and facilitates wise, emotionally intelligent reasoning 
(Grossmann & Kross, 2014a).  
rd
 person self-talk facilitate emotion-control? Common experience suggests 
that it is easier to reason objectively about other people’s problems than about one’s own. 3rd 
person self-talk operates via a similar mechanism. When people use their name to reflect on the 
self, they think about the self similar to how they think about others (Grossmann & Kross, 
2014b; Kross et al., 2014; Moser et al., 2017), which provides them with the psychological 
distance needed to navigate stressful experiences more objectively (e.g., Beck, 1970; Bernstein et 
al., 2015; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Mischel & 
Rodriguez, 1993; Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
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Importantly, recent findings suggest that 3rd person self-talk facilitates emotion regulation 
relatively effortlessly, without consuming cognitive control resources that become depleted 
under stress. For example, a recent Event Related Potential (ERP) study (Moser et al., 2017, 
Study 1),  found that non-1st person self-talk led to reductions in a neurophysiological marker of 
emotional reactivity (i.e., the Late Positive Potential) while viewing negative emotional pictures 
without enhancing activations in a neurophysiological marker of cognitive control (i.e., the 
Stimulus Preceding Negativity). These findings were conceptually replicated using fMRI (Moser 
et al., 2017, Study 2), providing converging evidence for the idea that 3rd
Research questions 
 person self-talk 
constitutes a relatively effortless emotion regulation tool.  
In sum, extant research suggests that 3rd
We addressed this question by examining whether cueing a large sample of people living 
across the United States to engage in 3
 person self-talk constitutes a relatively easy-to-
implement tool for facilitating emotion-regulation. However, the majority of the aforementioned 
work has been performed with relatively small samples of undergraduates in the laboratory using 
standardized techniques for eliciting emotion. Thus, whether (and how) this tool is effective for 
helping people cope with acute stressors in vivo is unknown.  
rd
 person (vs. 1st
The unique nature of these data also allowed us to address two important additional 
questions. First, does a linear dose-response relationship characterize the link between 3
 person) self-talk to reason about their 
deepest thoughts and feelings about Ebola as concerns about this disease peaked in the United 
States during the Fall of 2014 would nudge them into reasoning about Ebola more rationally, in 
ways that predicted declines in their worry and risk perception. Supplementary Figure 1 provides 
a timeline illustrating when the study was implemented relative to other events concerning 
Ebola.  
rd
 person 
self-talk and rational thinking? Although participants are typically able to easily implement 1st 
and 3rd person self-talk instructions, they often differ in the extent to which they use 1st or 3rd
Second, do individual differences in baseline Ebola worry moderate the benefits of 3
 
person parts of speech when reasoning about emotional issues. Thus, we examined whether 
variability in the degree to which people use these different parts of speech impacts the 
effectiveness of this intervention.  
rd
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person self-talk? Although some research indicates that distancing strategies work best for 
individuals who score high on individual difference measures of distress, other work has 
revealed main effects only of distancing strategies (Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross, Gard, Deldin, 
Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012; Park et al., 2014; Penner et al., 2015; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2011). Given such conflicting findings, we examined whether participants who were more 
worried about Ebola at the start of the study benefited the most from implementing 3rd
Hypotheses 
 person 
self-talk. 
We hypothesized that participants in the 3rd person self-talk group would use more 3rd vs. 
1st person language when they reasoned about Ebola compared to participants in the 1st person 
group, which would enhance their ability to identify fact-based reasons not to worry about 
Ebola.1
----Figure 1 Here---- 
 In turn, we expected focusing on fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola would 
reduce participants (a) Ebola worry, (b) probability estimates concerning how likely they were to 
contract Ebola, and (c) assessments of how long Ebola would remain a concern in the United 
States. As Figure 1 illustrates, we were uncertain about which, if any links in our theoretical 
model participants’ baseline levels of worry surrounding Ebola would moderate. Therefore, we 
examined moderation at each path.  
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants  
1257 individuals from across the United States were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. This online platform allowed us to study a large number of participants from a 
range of backgrounds living across the United States during the height of the Ebola crisis. 
We aimed to run 1000 participants to test our predictions robustly with a large and broad 
sample of participants from across the United States. Thus, the online platform that we used to 
recruit participants collected data until 1000 complete responses were obtained. We collected 
data from more than 1000 participants because several participants began but did not complete 
                                                          
1
 Including the degree to which participants used 3rd vs. 1st person language in their essays as an 
intervening variable between Condition and Fact-based Reasons Not to Worry allowed us to 
examine whether a linear (or non-linear) dose-response characterizes the relationship between 
these variables. 
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
SELF-TALK EBOLA  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
6 
the study (as is often the case on the online platform we used to run the study). Supplementary 
Figure 2 provides a geographical breakdown of the sample.  
To be eligible, participants had to declare themselves native English language speakers. 
Two hundred and forty (240) participants started but did not complete the task, 8 subjects did not 
write on topic, and 1 subject did not provide responses to multiple key variables, leaving 1008 
subjects for analysis (nfemale = 538, nmale = 466, nother or missing = 4, Mage = 36.03, SDage
Table 1 describes the sample demographics; Table 2 presents means, standard deviations 
and zero-order correlations for all key study variables. Attrition was related to condition, OR = 
0.45, z = -4.77, p < .001; more 3rd person self-talk participants dropped out. However, as noted 
below, covariate analyses demonstrated that several theoretically relevant background variables 
did not influence the results. 
 = 12.90). 
All participants provided informed consent and all procedures were performed in compliance 
with the Internal Review Board at the first author’s institution. Participants were compensated 
$0.50 for their participation.  
 
----Table 1 Here---- 
 
----Table 2 Here---- 
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Cover story  
Participants were told the study focused on people's feelings and ways of thinking about 
current events.  
Baseline Ebola Worry 
Next, participants rated how worried they were about Ebola2 using a slider scale (0 = not 
at all worried, 10 = extremely worried). We embedded this question among a series of filler 
items that asked participants to rate how worried they were about several other current issues 
(e.g., terrorism, mass shootings, climate change, skin cancer). The 3rd person group (M = 3.71, 
SD = 3.20) scored marginally lower on this measure than the 1st
We also examined whether baseline worry about health and current events in general 
influenced our results by collapsing scores on each of the five questions we administered at 
baseline (α = .72) to form a single index of baseline worry (M = 4.57, SD = 2.14). The groups did 
not vary on this variable, t(1006) = 1.33, p = .184. Replacing the baseline Ebola worry measure 
with this composite index of baseline worry did not substantively alter any of the results we 
report.  
 person group (M = 4.09, SD = 
3.39), t(1006) = 1.83, p = .067.  
Manipulation 
Next, participants were told that we were interested in exploring their thoughts about 
Ebola. They were told that, “recently, Ebola has become a widespread concern. In this study we 
are interested in learning about different ways that people think about this issue”. They were then 
randomly assigned to write about their thoughts and feelings about Ebola using either 1st person 
language or 3rd person language following procedures adapted from those used by Kross and 
colleagues (2014). Participants in the 1st
Some people report thinking about current events in the first-person. For example, they 
use the first-person pronouns “I” and “my” as they reflect on their thoughts and feelings 
surrounding current events and ask themselves, "Why am “I" feeling this way?" 
 person self-talk group received the following 
instructions:  
                                                          
2
 Although we did not ask participants’ to directly rate how proximal the threat of Ebola seemed, 
worry is generally thought to capture the degree to which one feels threatened by an experience 
that is perceived to be imminent or psychological proximal (e.g., Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Bredemeier, 2007; Chandran & Menon, 2004; Tallis & Eysenck, 1994). Thus, this measure 
constitutes a reasonable proxy for perceived psychological distance of the Ebola threat. 
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This is what we would like you to do today. Please take a few minutes to think and write 
about your deepest thoughts and feelings surrounding Ebola using the first-person 
pronouns, “I” and “my.” 
 
Please use these parts of speech as much as possible as you try to understand your 
thoughts and feelings surrounding Ebola. In other words, ask yourself, “Why am I feeling 
this way? “What are the underlying causes and reasons for my feelings?” and then answer 
those questions using first-person pronouns.  
 
Participants in the 3rd
Some people report thinking about current events in the third-person. For example, they 
use their own name and third-person pronouns such as “he” or “she" as they reflect 
on their thoughts and feelings surrounding current events and ask themselves, "Why is 
[Your Name] feeling this way?" 
 person self-talk group received the following instructions:  
 
This is what we would like you to do today. Please take a few minutes to think and write 
about your deepest thoughts and feelings surrounding Ebola using your own name and 
third-person pronouns such as “he” and “she.”  
 
Please use these parts of speech as much as possible as you try to understand your 
thoughts and feelings surrounding Ebola. In other words, ask yourself, “Why is [Your 
Name] feeling this way?" “What are the underlying causes and reasons 
for his feelings?” and then answer those questions using your own name and third-
person pronouns. 
 
Participants then pressed the “next” button to continue and were provided with a text box 
to write their responses. Above the text box we included the following set of instructions to 
remind them how to think and write about their thoughts and feelings about Ebola: 
Remember to use the first-person pronoun "I" [your own name and third-person 
pronouns, for example, "he" or "she"] as much as possible as you try to understand 
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the thoughts and emotions you are currently experiencing around Ebola. 
 
Participants were given as much time as they needed to write their essays. Third-person 
self-talk participants spent marginally more time (M = 3.37 min, SD = 2.60 min) writing their 
responses compared to 1st
Degree of 3
 person participants (M = 3.09 min, SD = 2.47 min; t(1006) = -1.75, p = 
.081), but controlling for this variable did not influence any of the results reported below—all 
path coefficients remained at similar levels of significance. Therefore, we do not discuss this 
variable further. The two groups did not differ on the overall number of words they used in their 
essays, t(1006) = -0.48, p = .635.  
rd
 and 1st Person Language Use 
Although our manipulation directly targeted participants’ use of 3rd vs. 1st person 
singular language in their writing samples, we reasoned that there would nonetheless be 
variability in the degree to which participants used these different parts of speech in each 
condition. Therefore, we created 3rd and 1st person language-use variables to examine the role 
that this variability plays in impacting fact-based, rational thinking.  
1st person singular language use (e.g., I, me, my) was computed as a percentage of each 
participant’s essay via Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC), an automated text analysis 
software package(Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). We converted 1st person scores to count 
scores by multiplying LIWC percentages by each participant’s word count (M = 3.30, SD = 
3.98). We used count scores (rather than percentages) because our statistical models controlled 
for overall word count. Because LIWC does not contain a dictionary that automatically codes for 
the use of 3rd person singular pronouns or one’s name when referring to the self, we manually 
coded for this variable by counting the number of times participants used their own name and 3rd
As expected, participants in the 1
 
person singular pronouns to refer to the self (M = 2.41, SD = 3.43).  
st
 person self-talk group used significantly more 1st 
person singular pronouns compared to participants in the 3rd person group, t(1006) = -31.21, p < 
.001, d = 1.97, and participants in the 3rd person group used more 3rd person singular language 
compared to participants in the 1st
See supplement for analyses examining the independent role that 1
 person group, t(1006) = 35.34, p < .001, d = 2.23. 
st
 and 3rd
Writing Sample Content Analyses 
 person 
language use played in the current study.  
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Two judges blind to condition content-analyzed participants’ writing samples for whether 
they described reasons not to worry about Ebola (no = 0, yes = 1). To ensure that coders 
remained blind to conditions, all 3rd person essays were converted into 1st person essays before 
judges commenced coding (e.g., names and 3rd person pronouns were replaced with “I” or other 
relevant 1st
Once judges determined which essays contained reasons not to worry, they performed 
additional coding to determine whether these essays described fact-based reasons not to worry 
about Ebola (no reasons = 0, reasons = 1; κ = .81), the specific construct that we were interested 
in a priori—i.e., mentioning facts regarding the Ebola disease (e.g., “I know the disease is not 
transmitted via the air but rather by transmission [through] body fluids”) and medical 
infrastructure in the United States for combatting an Ebola epidemic (e.g., “[the] medical 
facilities in the U.S. are much better able to cope with and isolate instances [of Ebola] when the 
disease appears, as opposed to the very ill-prepared areas in Africa.”). Discrepancies between 
judges were resolved after initial reliability was demonstrated. 52.88% of essays contained fact-
based reasons not to worry about Ebola. Of the essays that contained reasons not to worry about 
Ebola, 81.62% mentioned fact-based reasons (see Supplement for additional analyses on another 
type of reason provided—media sensationalism [e.g., “news outlets are purposely 
sensationalizing [Ebola] for ratings”). 
 person pronouns). After establishing reliability (κ = .88), judges discussed cases on 
which they disagreed to reach consensus. 
Post Manipulation Ebola Worry 
After writing their responses, participants answered the following three questions to 
assess how worried they were about Ebola using a sliding scale: How worried are you about 
Ebola? (0 = “Not at all worried” to 10 = “Extremely worried”; M = 3.87, SD = 3.26); What is 
your current level of worry around the issue of Ebola? (0 = “Not at all anxious” to 10 = 
“Extremely anxious”; M = 3.39, SD = 3.03); How worried are you about getting Ebola? (0 = 
“Not at all worried” to 10 = “Extremely worried”; M = 2.73, SD = 2.98). Scores on these 
measures were highly correlated (α = .96) and summed to form a single index of Ebola-related 
worry.  
Ebola Risk Probability 
After rating how worried they were about Ebola, participants estimated the probability 
out of 100% that they would contract Ebola, M = 5.57%, SD = 12.03% (range: 0 – 90%). Risk 
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probability was entered in models on a 0.0 – 1.0 scale. 18.55% of participants reported a 0% 
probability of contracting Ebola.  
Ebola Risk Persistence 
Next, participants were asked to indicate how long they thought Ebola would remain a 
concern in the United States on a 1 (less than a week) to 5 (more than a year) scale, M = 3.55, SD 
= 0.97. We administered this measure to assess participants’ general risk perception. That is, 
their concern about Ebola being a concern for the nation as a whole, rather than for them 
individually. 3
Distance from Ebola Cases 
 We administered this item in addition to the Ebola Risk Probability measure 
described above because we were interested in assessing both personal and general risk 
perception, which prior research has drawn a distinction between (Sjoberg, 2000; Tyler & Cook, 
1984).  
We calculated participants’ physical proximity from either of the two documented cases 
of Ebola in the US (Dallas, TX and Manhattan, NY) by computing the distance (in miles) 
between participant’s city of residence and Dallas and Belleview Hospital in New York City. 
Eleven subjects reported their city of residence outside of the lower 48 states (i.e., Alaska or 
Hawaii), which skewed the data, so these subjects were recoded with the maximum value of 
subjects in the contiguous 48 states (adjusted Dallas distance M = 1004.31 miles, SD = 390.98 
miles; adjusted New York distance M = 1035.04 miles, SD = 826.64 miles). The groups did not 
differ on either of these variables, ts(1000) < |0.40|, ps > .70.  
Socioeconomic Status (SES) 
Education and income were combined to create a composite SES variable. Education was 
collapsed into three levels consisting of -1 = less than high school and high school/GED, 0 = 
associate’s and bachelor’s, 1 = Master’s and professional degrees, and income was converted 
into a numeric variable with six levels. Both variables were z-scored and averaged to form a 
single SES variable. Seven subjects were missing data on this variable. The groups did not differ 
on this variable, t(999) = -1.22, p = .22. 
                                                          
3
 The item we used to assess Ebola risk persistence demonstrates good face validity and 
reasonable discriminative and convergent validity (i.e., it correlates positively with the Ebola 
Worry and Ebola Probability items and negatively with Fact-based reasoning). Critically, none of 
the significant correlations we observed between the above variables were so strong to suggest 
that this item was redundant with the other measures we administered. 
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Results 
Overview of analyses 
We used path models to test the theoretical model guiding our research. Path models 
were run in R 3.1.2 using the lavaan 0.5-20 package (Rosseel, 2012). Because our main mediator 
variable, fact-based reasons not to worry, was an endogenous binary variable, and the 
distributions of other variables (e.g., Ebola probability, baseline Ebola worry, distance from an 
Ebola case) were skewed, we used a diagonally weighted least squares estimator that does not 
make assumptions about the underlying distributions of variables and can accommodate binary 
variables (Finney & DiStefano, 2006; Nye & Drasgow, 2010). Model estimates were 
bootstrapped 1,000 times. 
Note that we do not report beta values and confidence intervals for the indirect effects 
that explain the relationship between condition and each of the outcome variables we assessed. 
Such effects are typically calculated with a product of coefficients approach, but when including 
non-normally distributed endogenous variables (in the current case, fact-based reasoned not to 
worry about Ebola) this calculated beta is not interpretable (Hayes, 2013; Valeri & 
VanderWeele, 2013). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the 95% confidence intervals 
characterizing the indirect effect of condition on each of our three outcome variables did not 
include zero. 
Moderation analyses. We were uncertain about which, if any links in our theoretical 
model participants’ baseline levels of worry surrounding Ebola would moderate. Therefore we 
initially examined whether baseline Ebola worry moderated each link in our model after 
standardizing baseline Ebola worry scores. The final model we report included the Condition X 
Baseline Ebola worry term at all paths where a significant relationship was observed (Fact usage  Ebola worry, Fact usage  Ebola probability, and Fact usage  Ebola persistence). Baseline 
Ebola worry and essay word counts were controlled for at all model paths.  
Model fit indexes. Model fit was primarily evaluated using CFI and RMSEA, which both 
provide an estimate of model fit per degree of freedom. CFI is a “goodness of fit” statistic with 
values above .90 and .95 indicating adequate and good fits, respectively, and RMSEA is a 
“badness of fit” statistic with values below 0.08 and 0.05 suggesting adequate and good fits, 
respectively. TLI and NFI are suggested to be higher than 0.95 (L.-t. Hu & Bentler, 1998; L. t. 
Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
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Effect sizes. Unlike univariate and multivariate tests, there are no straightforward ways to 
quantify effect sizes in SEM. We nevertheless sought to provide readers with a way of drawing 
inferences about the effects sizes characterizing the different significant links we observed in our 
model in two ways. First, in the case of a categorical variable (e.g., condition) predicting a 
continuous measure (e.g., 3rd vs. 1st person language use) we describe how a shift in the 
categorical variable (e.g., 1st person group to 3rd person group) shifts the dependent variable in 
terms of standard deviation units (e.g. “Condition shifted language usage by X standard 
deviations…”). These differences approximate Cohen’s d and are hence denoted Effect Size dapx. 
Second, in the case of a continuous variable (e.g., 3rd vs. 1st
Primary Analyses 
 person language use) predicting a 
categorical measure (e.g., fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola), we describe how 
participants one standard deviation above/below the mean compare in percentage terms on their 
likelihood of shifting from one level to the other on the dependent variable.  
As expected, participants in the 3rd person self-talk group used more 3rd vs. 1st person 
language than participants in the 1st person self-talk group when they reasoned about Ebola, b = 
10.68, 95% CI = [10.23, 11.14], Effect Size dapx = 1.63. This shift in language use predicted 
increases in participants’ tendency to generate fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola, b = 
0.023, 95% CI = [0.002, 0.045]—participants who scored high on 3rd vs. 1st
Baseline Ebola worry did, however, moderate the links between fact-based reasoning and 
each of the outcome variables we assessed. As Figure 2 and Table 3 illustrate, the more worried 
participants were about Ebola at the start of the study, the more generating fact-based reasons not 
to worry predicted reductions in their Ebola worry, Effect Size d
 person language use 
(i.e., one standard deviation above the mean) were 10.45% more likely to generate fact-based 
reasons not to worry about Ebola compared to participants who scored low on this variable (i.e., 
one standard deviation below the sample mean; see Figure 2 and Table 3). Neither of the above 
results were moderated by baseline Ebola worry (see Table 4).  
apx = .38, judgments about how 
likely they were to contract Ebola, Effect Size dapx = .75, and estimates of how long Ebola would 
remain a concern in the United States, Effect Size dapx
In contrast, the relationships between generating fact-based reasons not to worry about 
Ebola and each of the outcome variables we assessed were not significant among participants 
who scored low on baseline Ebola worry with one exception—focusing on fact-based reasons 
 = .29.  Au
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predicted slightly higher Ebola probability estimates among low baseline Ebola worry 
participants. One interpretation of this finding is that people who came into the study not worried 
about Ebola initially underestimated their potential risk, and thinking about the facts surrounding 
the disease made them aware of this. This interpretation notwithstanding, the magnitude of this 
effect was considerably weaker (a 0.26% increase in likelihood estimates) in comparison to the 
beneficial effect we observed of focusing on facts for high baseline Ebola worry participants (a 
7.18% decrease in likelihood estimates). Thus, the benefits of the intervention for this variable 
were 27.62 times larger than its cost. 
All model fit statistics indicated that the above model fit the data well (model 
comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.997, normed fit index (NFI) = 
0.999, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.021. 
We also examined whether the aforementioned findings held when several theoretically 
relevant covariates were simultaneously added to the analyses, including participants’ physical 
proximity to a documented case of Ebola in Dallas or New York City, gender, and 
socioeconomic status. As Table 3 indicates, including these covariates did not substantively alter 
the results we reported above; all model fit indices indicated that the model including these 
additional covariates continued to fit the model well: CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, NFI = 1.00, 
RMSEA = .003. 
----Figure 2 Here---- 
 
----Table 3 Here---- 
 
----Table 4 Here---- 
Discussion 
Despite public health officials’ repeated reassurances that the actual risk of an Ebola 
epidemic in the United States was small during the Fall of 2014, anxiety gripped the United 
States for several weeks—a familiar phenomenon that plays out to varying degrees across the 
globe every time a new disease (e.g., H1N1, Asian Bird Flu, etc.) is introduced. The current 
findings demonstrate that under such circumstances, cueing vulnerable individuals to engage in 
3rd person self-talk has the potential to adaptively transform the way they reason about such 
threats.  
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At a basic level, these findings shed light on how 3rd person self-talk promotes rational 
thinking—by identifying fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola. They also suggest that a 
linear dose-response relationship underlies the effect of 3rd person language use on rational 
thinking. Specifically, although participants in the 3rd person group used more 3rd vs. 1st person 
language overall when reasoning about Ebola compared to participants in the 1st person group, 
the degree to which they used 3rd vs. 1st
The current results also contribute to a growing body of research suggesting that self-
distancing techniques are particularly effective for vulnerable individuals (Kross & Ayduk, 2009; 
Kross et al., 2012; Park et al., 2014; Penner et al., 2015), as participants who scored low on 
baseline Ebola worry did not display reductions in Ebola worry and risk perception as a function 
of the intervention. One interpretation of this finding is that a certain level of negative emotion is 
needed for this technique to be effective. For people experiencing little or no negative affect to 
start with, there may be little room for 3
 person language predicted the extent to which they were 
likely to generate fact-based reasons not to worry.  
rd
It is notable that the manipulation we tested in this study was administered in a relatively 
“noisy” environment—i.e., participants living across the United States completed the study 
outside the laboratory. That we observed statistically significant effects in spite of these 
uncontrolled conditions speaks to the potential scalability of this intervention. 
 person self-talk to have an emotion regulatory effect.  
Future research 
Future research is needed to examine whether these findings generalize to other anxiety-
provoking contexts surrounding the threat of infectious disease. In this vein, it is important to 
recognize that the objective risk of contracting Ebola in the United States was quite low. Thus, 
we predicted (and found) that increasing the accessibility of this information via 3rd person self-
talk would reduce participants’ worry and risk perception. It is possible that using 3rd person self-
talk to reason about diseases that are more easily contractible (e.g., Zika) might not have the 
same effect. In such cases, thinking about the facts surrounding disease transmission might not 
serve to reduce worry and risk perception and might even amplify it.  
Finally, although third person self-talk predicted reductions in Ebola worry and risk 
perception among high baseline worry participants, it increased participants estimates of how 
likely they would be to contract Ebola among low baseline Ebola worry participants. We are 
cautious about over interpreting this finding given that it was not predicted, and we did not see 
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this pattern emerge across the other two dependent variables we administered. However, it raises 
an interesting possibility—that the consequences of thinking rationally about specific health risks 
may be quite different for people who are particularly worried about their health compared to 
those who are not. For worried participants who tend to overestimate their risk, thinking about 
the facts surrounding the possibility of contracting disease may reduce their worry and risk 
perception. But for non-worried participants who tend to underestimate their risk the reverse may 
be true—thinking about the facts surrounding disease contraction may enhance their worry and 
risk perception. Future research is needed to explore this possibility.   
Caveats 
Three caveats are in order before concluding. First, although 3rd person self-talk 
influenced each of our outcome variables indirectly, we observed a direct effect of condition on 
only one of our outcome variables (Ebola Persistence; Table 1).4
That said, the fact that we did not observe consistently significant direct effects suggests 
that 3
 Although researchers have 
traditionally been reluctant to interpret indirect effects in the absence of direct effects, over the 
past decade a consensus has emerged which suggests that direct effects need not (and should not) 
be required to establish indirect effects, especially when indirect effects are theory-guided as in 
the current work (Hayes, 2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010).  
rd
Second, attrition was higher and baseline Ebola worry was marginally lower in the 3
 person self-talk may activate additional processes beyond rational thinking that have 
opposite effects on our outcome variables. For example, it is possible that the novelty associated 
with asking participants to reflect on their feelings about Ebola using their name outside of the 
laboratory enhanced their general levels of uncertainty, which positively influenced their worry 
and personal risk perception (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012). Future research should address this 
possibility and is important for refining our understanding of how third person self-talk operates 
outside the laboratory and enhancing its potential application value—i.e. interventions could be 
designed to reduce feelings of uncertainty surrounding the use of this technique, thus potentially 
strengthening the direct effects of the intervention to the levels observed in laboratory studies 
(Kross et al., 2014).  
rd
                                                          
4
 There is no obvious theoretical reason for why this variable demonstrated a direct effect 
whereas the other two variables did not. Thus, we are cautious not to over interpret this result. 
 
Au
th
or
 M
an
us
cr
ip
t
SELF-TALK EBOLA  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
17 
person self-talk group. Although we cannot determine why this occurred, it is possible that this 
may have resulted from either random chance or the novelty of the 3rd person writing 
instructions, which could have as noted above aroused feelings of uncertainty and discomfort. 
Critically, all results controlled for baseline Ebola worry. Moreover, moderation analyses 
indicated that the more worried participants were about Ebola at baseline the more they benefited 
from the manipulation. This suggests that these differences likely worked against us finding 
evidence to support our predictions. That is, having fewer high worry participants in the 3rd 
person condition, and having the 3rd
Finally, we used single items to measure Ebola risk probability and persistence. Future 
research should consider using multi-item measure to reduce measurement noise.    
 person self-talk manipulation be stronger for participants 
with higher baseline worry likely made it harder to find effects.  
Concluding Comment 
These findings provide preliminary evidence highlighting the potential utility of 3rd
 
 
person self-talk for helping vulnerable individuals think more rationally about pressing public 
health concerns, in ways that reduce their worry and risk perception. More broadly, they 
highlight the value of examining how laboratory research on the self and emotion regulation 
translate to real world contexts (Bryan, Walton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011; Finkel, Slotter, 
Luchies, Walton, & Gross, 2013; Walton, 2014). 
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics 
 
 
 Demographic Variable Percentage 
Race 
 
 
White 76.59% 
 
African American 7.54% 
 
Hispanic/Latino 5.26% 
 
Asian American 5.16% 
 
Multiracial 3.48% 
 
Other 1.49% 
 
No response 0.50% 
Education Level 
 
 
< High School 0.50% 
 
High School/GED 31.35% 
 
Associate's Degree 13.29% 
 
Bachelor's Degree 38.49% 
 
Master's & Professional Degree 15.87% 
 
No response 0.50% 
Annual Income  
 
< $15,000 22.12% 
 
$15,000 – $25,000 17.46% 
 
$25,000 – $45,000 25.79% 
 
$45,000 – $65,000 17.49% 
 
$65,000 – $85,000 8.83% 
> $85,000 7.24% 
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, number of observations, and zero-order correlations for key study variables across 
participants. 
 
 Variable M SD n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1 Post Manipulation Ebola Worry 9.99 8.90 1008 -- .56 .45 -.50 -.07 .90 -.03 .00 .01 
 
2 Post Manipulation Ebola Probability 5.57% 12.03% 1008  -- .26 -.32 -.04 .48 .00 .01 -.04 
 
3 Post Manipulation Ebola Persistence 3.55 0.97 1008   -- -.28 -.02 .41 -.05 .01 .03 
 
4 
 
Fact-Based Reasons 0.53 0.50 1008    -- .09 -.46 .03 -.01 .01 
 
5 
 
3rd - 1st Person Language Use1 -0.89 6.54 1008     -- -.08 .04 .03 .06 
 
6 
 
Baseline Ebola Worry 3.91 3.31 1008      -- -.04 -.02 .00 
 
7 
 
Distance From Dallas 1004.31 390.98 1002       -- .05 .05 
 
8 
 
Distance From NYC 1035.04 826.64 1002        -- -.12 
 
9 
 
Socioeconomic Status (SES) 0.00 0.82 1001         -- 
Note. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p < .05. Correlations were performed on all available data. Thus, degrees of 
freedom vary slightly across cells because of missing data. Outlier adjusted means (see Methods for description) are presented for 
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the distance from NYC & Dallas variable. All correlations reported are zero-order with the exception of those involving the 3rd – 1st 
Person Language Use, which controlled for essay word count as well.  
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Table 3. Parameter estimates for primary and covariate analyses.  
  
 Primary Model  Covariate Model 
 
Beta (SE) 95% CI Std. B  Beta (SE) 95% CI Std. B 
Model Pathways        
  Con  Language Use 10.682 (0.231) [10.225, 11.137] 0.817  10.677 (0.245) [10.191, 11.142] 0.815 
  Language Use  Facts  0.023 (0.011) [0.002, 0.045] 0.120  0.024 (0.012) [0.002, 0.049] 0.129 
  Con  Fact Usage -0.138 (0.150) [-0.434, 0.156] -0.056  -0.158 (0.158) [-0.457, 0.155] -0.064 
  Con  Worry -0.145 (0.437) [-1.011, 0.748] -0.008  -0.149 (0.441) [-1.057, 0.734] -0.008 
  Con  Probability 0.009 (0.012) [-0.013, 0.033] 0.038  0.008 (0.011) [-0.013, 0.032] 0.034 
  Con  Persistence -0.201 (0.103) [-0.415, -0.004] -0.104  -0.220 (0.105) [-0.430, -0.010] -0.114 
  Language Use  Worry 0.026 (0.037) [-0.051, 0.101] 0.019  0.022 (0.037) [-0.051, 0.095] 0.017 
  Language Use  Probability 0.000 (0.001) [-0.002, 0.001] -0.010  0.000 (0.001) [-0.002, 0.001] -0.012 
  Language Use  Persistence 0.017 (0.008) [0.002, 0.034] 0.116  0.018 (0.008) [0.001, 0.034] 0.123 
  Baseline Ebola Worry  Language Use -0.178 (0.124) [-0.419, 0.081] -0.027  -0.172 (0.119) [-0.411, 0.061] -0.026 
  Baseline Ebola Worry  Facts -0.676 (0.048) [-0.780, -0.587] -0.551  -0.680 (0.049) [-0.784, -0.592] -0.552 
  Baseline Ebola Worry  Worry 7.055 (0.177) [6.660, 7.386] 0.793  6.997 (0.182) [6.637, 7.335] 0.787 
  Baseline Ebola Worry  Probability 0.036 (0.006) [0.024, 0.047] 0.302  0.035 (0.005) [0.022, 0.044] 0.289 
  Baseline Ebola Worry  Persistence 0.272 (0.038) [0.197, 0.347] 0.281  0.257 (0.039) [0.177, 0.332] 0.265 
High Baseline Ebola Worry        
Facts  Worry -2.898 (0.406) [-3.721, -2.131] -0.250  -2.940 (0.404) [-3.736, -2.130] -0.252 
Facts  Probability -0.071 (0.013) [-0.096, -0.047] -0.432  -0.071 (0.013) [-0.096, -0.048] -0.430 
Facts  Persistence -0.302 (0.071) [-0.444, -0.169] -0.267  -0.304 (0.071) [-0.446, -0.171] -0.271 
Low Baseline Ebola Worry        
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Facts  Worry 0.500 (0.273) [-0.050, 1.014] -0.080  0.553 (0.280) [-0.003, 1.094] -0.078 
Facts  Probability 0.019 (0.007) [0.003, 0.032] -0.102  0.020 (0.007) [0.005, 0.033] -0.094 
Facts  Persistence -0.017 (0.077) [-0.174, 0.128] -0.136  -0.021 (0.077) [-0.182, 0.127] -0.141 
Note. Betas, SEs, 95% CIs, and standardized betas are reported. Con=Condition, Language Use=3rd - 1st person language use, 
Facts=Fact-based Reasons Not to Worry About Ebola, Worry=Ebola Worry, Probability=Ebola Probability, Persistence = Ebola 
Persistence, Baseline Ebola Worry =standardized baseline Ebola worry. Primary model=Model described under “primary analyses.” 
Covariate model=Model including covariates. Both models control for word count (in addition to baseline Ebola worry) at all links.  
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Table 4. Moderation estimates by baseline Ebola worry for primary and covariate analyses.  
 
Primary Model Covariate Model 
Moderation Path Estimate Beta (SE) 95% CI Std. B 
 
Beta (SE) 95% CI Std. B 
Con  Language Use -0.484 (0.362) [-1.148, 0.271] -0.074 -0.519 (0.364) [-1.166, 0.255] -0.079 
Language Use  Facts 0.015 (0.013) [-0.008, 0.040] 0.083 
 
0.013 (0.013) [-0.012, 0.038] 0.071 
Facts  Worry -1.691 (0.303) [-2.294, -1.091] -0.084 
 
-1.736 (0.293) [-2.296, -1.155] -0.087 
Facts  Probability -0.045 (0.008) [-0.061, -0.030] -0.165 
 
-0.045 (0.008) [-0.061, -0.030] -0.168 
Facts  Persistence -0.153 (0.063) [-0.273, -0.026] -0.070 
 
-0.153 (0.067) [-0.282, -0.026] -0.070 
Con  Facts -0.061 (0.084) [-0.226, 0.103] -0.050 
 
-0.042 (0.085) [-0.210, 0.114] -0.034 
Con  Worry -0.090 (0.243) [-0.560, 0.383] -0.010 
 
-0.082 (0.228) [-0.518, 0.379] -0.009 
Con  Probability 0.009 (0.008) [-0.007, 0.024] 0.073 
 
0.008 (0.008) [-0.008, 0.023] 0.064 
Con  Persistence 0.011 (0.053) [-0.098, 0.113] 0.012 
 
0.014 (0.054) [-0.086, 0.127] 0.014 
Language Use  Worry 0.015 (0.041) [-0.074, 0.092] 0.011 
 
0.013 (0.039) [-0.068, 0.086] 0.009 
Language Use  Probability -0.001 (0.001) [-0.003, 0.001] -0.059 
 
-0.001 (0.001) [-0.003, 0.001] -0.057 
Language Use  Persistence 0.008 (0.008) [-0.008, 0.024] 0.054 
 
0.008 (0.009) [-0.010, 0.023] 0.052 
Note. Betas, standard errors (SEs), 95% confidence intervals, and standardized betas are reported. Con = Condition, Language Use = 
3rd minus 1st person language usage, Facts = Fact-based Reasons Not to Worry About Ebola, Worry = Ebola Worry, Probability = 
Ebola Probability, Persistence = Ebola Persistence. Primary model = Model described under “primary analyses.” Covariate model = 
Model described under “covariate analyses.” Both models control for word count in addition to baseline Ebola worry at all links. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
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Figure 2. Path Analyses. (A) Indirect pathway demonstrating that the manipulation led all participants to use more 3rd vs. 1st person language in 
their essays, which enhanced fact-based reasons not to worry. Generating fact-based reason not to worry, in turn, reduced high (but not low) baseline 
worry participants Ebola worry and risk perception. Bar graphs illustrating the effect of (B) Condition on degree of 3rd vs. 1st Person Language Use. 
(C) Line graph illustrating the relationship between 3rd vs. 1st Person Language Usage and the probability of generating fact-based reasons not to 
worry about Ebola. (D-F) Bar graphs demonstrating that generating fact-based reasons not to worry about Ebola (“Facts”) led to lower Ebola Worry, 
Ebola Probability, and Ebola Persistence judgments compared to not generating fact-based reasons (“No Facts”) for high baseline Ebola Worry 
participants but not low baseline Ebola Worry participants. Error bars reflect +/- 1 Standard Error.  
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